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Why has "art" been the subject of so many recent censorship attacks? The
attacks on art point to an unsolved problem in First Amendment theory: how do we
justify protection for art under a vision of the First Amendment that values only
rational ideas and straightforward political argument? How does art-
nondiscursive, non-verbal, often irrational, expression-fit into this picture?
In this piece, I argue that contemporary First Amendment battles over art
must be understood in light of the history of iconoclasm and the anxiety that
surrounds visual, as opposed to verbal, representation. By refraining the debate in
this way, I show that scholars have overlooked an important, albeit improbable,
source for justifying the protection of art as speech.
I address these issues by asking first, why do we-in fact, do we?-protect
art under the First Amendment? And second, why have we displayed such an
impulse to censor and attack art? I argue that the answer to both questions ought to
be the same: The very things about art that make us uncomfortable and that fuel our
impulse to censor it-its force beyond words, its power and its irrationality-
should make it fully protected speech under the First Amendment. But to reach this
conclusion, we must rethink the marketplace of ideas model that lies at the
foundation of First Amendment law.
Associate Professor, N.Y.U. School of Law. This piece was originally presented as one of the two
Edward G. Donley Memorial Lectures I gave at the West Virginia University College of Law. For helpful
comments, I would like to thank Harry Adler, Ed Baker, Barry Friedman, Dan Filler and the faculty of the
West Virginia College of Law. Keith Buell and Corey Endo provided excellent research assistance.
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I. CENSORING ART
If we review the so-called "culture wars"1 of the 1990's, it is clear that art
has been on the front lines of the most prominent censorship battles.2 The culture
wars began in 1989 with two highly publicized attacks on artists: Robert
Mapplethorpe,3 known for his elegantly homoerotic nudes, and Andres Serrano,
whose claim to fame was a photograph of a crucifix submerged in the artist's own
urine.4 Since then, controversies over art have erupted with predictable regularity.
Government funding for the arts has captured much of our attention. Recently, the
1 See generally CULTURE WARS: DOCUMENTS FROM THE RECENT CONTROVERSIES IN THE ARTS
(Richard Bolton ed., 1992); JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA
(1991).
2 For a discussion of contemporary art and its vulnerability to government censorship, see Amy
Adler, Post-Modem Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359 (1990); Amy Adler, Why Art Is
On Trial, 22 J. ARTS MGMT. L. & Soc'Y 322 (1993). For various opinions on the politics of the art wars, see
ALICE GOLDFARB MARQUIS, ART LESSONS: LEARNING FROM THE RISE AND FALL OF PUBLIC ARTS FUNDING
(1995); Martha Bayles, Editorial, The Philistine Consensus, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1995, at A19 (describing
battle over leftist politics); Lynne A. Munson, Editorial, Art By Committee, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1995, at
A23 (criticizing trend of funding art that expresses leftist identity politics); 1-3 PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN
WAY, ARTISTIC FREEDOM UNDER ATTACK (1992-95) (documenting increasing attacks on artistic speech).
While examples of recent art controversies beyond those involving the NEA are too numerous to
catalogue here, several authors have analyzed and documented the growing incidence of attacks on artistic
expression. See, e.g., STEVEN C. DUBIN, ARRESTING IMAGES: IMPOLITIC ART AND UNCIVIL ACTIONS (1992)
(analyzing new climate of anger against art); MARJORIE HEINS, SEX, SIN, AND BLASPHEMY: A GUIDE TO
AMERICA'S CENSORSHIP WARS (1993) (describing numerous cases of attacks on art).
3 See ROBERT MAPPLETHORPE: THE PERFECT MOMENT (1989) (catalogue from exhibition at the
Institute of Contemporary Art). Mapplethorpe achieved national notoriety shortly after his death from AIDS
when a partially government-funded exhibition of his classical black and white photographs, some of them
picturing men in homoerotic and sadomasochistic positions, became the target of a congressional attack on
the NEA. See, e.g., Ingrid Sischy, Photography: White and Black, NEW YORKER, Nov. 13, 1989, at 124, 138-
39. ("the spectre of death" hangs over the pictures; "the information that Mapplethorpe died of AIDS is...
always available.") Members of Congress continually spoke of Mapplethorpe's disease. Senator Helms, for
example, calling Mapplethorpe's work "homosexual pornography," said Mapplethorpe "died of AIDS while
spending the last years of his life promoting homosexuality." 135 CONG. REC. S121 11 (daily ed. Sept. 28,
1989) (statement of Sen. Helms). See also id. at H3640-41 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (statement of Rep.
Dannemeyer) (noting Mapplethorpe's death from AIDS, and calling him a "homosexual activist[ ]"). See also
Hilton Kramer, Is Art Above the Laws of Decency?, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1989, 2, at 1 (denouncing
Mapplethorpe's work from an artistic, rather than political, perspective).
4 Serrano is the Hispanic/black artist who achieved notoriety when Senator Jesse Helms singled out
a Serrano photograph entitled Piss Christ in a show partially sponsored by the National Endowment for the
Arts ("NEA"). See C. Carr, Going to Extremes, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 20, 1990, at 67. See Ken Johnson,
Andres Serrano at Stux (Review of Exhibition), ART AM., Mar. 1991. Serrano became one of the plaintiffs in
the Finley case, decided by the Supreme Court in 1998. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S.
569 (1998).
Beginning in 1989, after controversy erupted over grants made by the NEA that helped to support
exhibitions of the work of artists Robert Mapplethorpe and Andres Serrano, Congress amended the statutory
rules that govern the awarding of NEA grants to deny funding to "obscene" art. Pub. L. No. 101-121, 304(a),
103 Stat. 701, 741 (1989). The new law was declared unconstitutionally vague. Bella Lewitzky Dance Found.
v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 781-82 (C.D. Cal. 1991. In 1990, Congress added the so-called "decency
rule" to the statute governing NEA grants. 20 U.S.C. 954(d) (1994). This rule was upheld by the Supreme
Court against a challenge claiming that the law was impermissible viewpoint discrimination and
unconstitutionally vague. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 588.
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 103, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol103/iss2/6
THE ART OF CENSORSHIP
Supreme Court entered the debate, issuing a ruling about the National Endowment
for the Arts' ("NEA") denial of grants to controversial performance artist Karen
Finley.5 In 1999, the "Sensation" exhibit at the Brooklyn Museum of Art, complete
with a dung-splattered portrait of the Virgin Mary, made front-page news when an
angry Mayor tried to revoke the Museum's lease.6 The political fights over national
funding for the arts now recur every year like a bad dream, featuring the same cast
of characters and a new, scandalous artist who is dug up to horrify and shock the
nation: artists such as photographers Merry Alpern and Barbara de Genevieve,
filmmaker Marion Riggs,8 or Ron Athey, the HIV-positive artist famed for his
performance piece in which he cut incisions into the back of another man, wiped
the wounds with paper towels, and draped the bloody towels over a stunned
audience in Minneapolis.?
In addition to these funding disputes, artists increasingly have been subject
to criminal prosecution and arrest. In the history of this country, there had never
been a prosecution brought against an art museum until 1989, when Cincinnati
brought obscenity charges against a museum there for displaying Mapplethorpe's
photographs.'" Since then, there have been several prominent criminal cases
brought against artists: in both Alabama and Tennessee, prosecutors brought
obscenity and child pornography charges against Barnes & Noble for selling
photography books by artists Jock Sturges and David Hamilton." (Sturges' studio
had been ransacked by an FBI raid in 1993, but a grand jury had refused to indict
5 See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
6 See Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) (granting museum's motion for preliminary injunction against the city); "Sensation" on Trial: Andrew
Ross Talks With Amy Adler, ARTFORUM, Nov. 1999, at 43 (interview); Dan Barry & Carol Vogel, Giuliani
Vows to Cut Subsidy Over 'Sick'Art, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1999, at Al. The city eventually settled with the
museum and restored all funding. See Alan Feuer, Giuliani Dropping His Bitter Battle With Art Museum,
N.Y. TIMEs, March 28,2000, at Al.
7 The disputes over Alpem and De Genevieve erupted when the NEA Advisory Council decided, in
an extraordinary last-minute measure, to reject the women's grants, which had already been approved through
the customary NEA peer panel process. Both of the rejected artists explicitly employ sexual images to make
what they argue is feminist art. Merry Alpem's rejected work consists of a series of photographs of prostitutes
that she took using a zoom camera to spy through the window of a brothel. See Jacqueline Trescott, Inside
Left Jabs, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1994, at G4; Richard B. Woodward, An NEA Closet Case: Photographer
Merry Alpern Peeps at a Wall Street Sex Club, VILLAGE VoICE, Dec. 13, 1994, at 37; Charles Storch, On
Arts Edge: Barbara deGenevieve at Odds With the NEA, CI. TRIB., Aug. 18, 1994, § 5, at 7.
8 See Marion T. Riggs, Meet the New Willie Horton, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1992, at A33 (describing
controversy over his PBS film about black gay men). See Marc Gunther, 'Tongues" Could Touch Off New
Protests, Orlando Sentinel, July 19, 1991, at E6 (noting that Riggs' film could trigger "another big battle over
art, government money and censorship").
9 See Edward Guthmann, Skin-Deep Look at an Artist of Pain, S.F. CHRoN., Feb. 10, 1999, at E2
("Athey, who is gay, HIV-positive and a former heroin junkie, cut a design in another man's back, blotted the
blood with paper towels and hung the towels on a clothesline above the audience.").
10 See supra note 3.
11 See J.R. Moehringer, A Pair of Books, a Bitter Debate: Is it Art or Indencency?, L.A. TIMEs, Mar.
9, 1998, at 3A.
2000]
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him.) 12 Oklahoma brought a child pornography prosecution against a video store
for renting the Academy Award-winning film The Tin Drum based on a novel by
Gunter Grass. Cincinnati police arrested bookstore employees for renting a film
by acclaimed Italian director Pier Paolo Pasolini.14 Hollywood studios reportedly
shunned the remake of the film Lolita because of fears of criminal prosecution;
despite the filmmakers' careful use of body doubles for all controversial scenes, it
took a year, as well as significant cutting, to find a studio willing to release the
film.' 5 Police have routinely stormed shows by performance artist Karen Finley. 6
Photographer Spencer Tunick, known for his work depicting large numbers of nude
people in public places, has been arrested five times. 7
The recent political and legal attacks portray art in two strangely
contradictory ways. On the one hand, critics denounce art for its pointlessness, its
self-indulgent, even decadent irrelevance. In an attack on the NEA, Newt Gingrich
described art as a "sandbox for the rich," "a plaything of pork ... for an elite
group."' 8 On the other hand, as these frequent controversies attest, there is
something about art that belies this portrait. Art seems particularly relevant and
threatening, certainly to its critics. Their attacks, and the resultant publicity that
they have received, give testament to another vision of art: as a powerful and
dangerous force that calls some to battle. These two contradictory views, evident in
political debate, also permeate our First Amendment jurisprudence of art.
II. WHY IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY THE PROTECTION OF
ARTISTIC EXPRESSION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
What is the status of art as "speech" under the First Amendment? The
answer is uncertain. 9 The Supreme Court seems to assume20 that art is protected
12 See Philip Hager, U.S. Grand Jury Refuses to Indict Photographer, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1991, at
A3.
13 See Lois Romano, Seizure of 1979 Art Film Draws Fire, WASH. POST, June 30, 1997, at Al. A
federal judge ruled that the film did not violate Oklahoma's statute. See Oklahoma v. Blockbuster Videos,
Inc., 27 Media L. Rep. 1248 (D. Ok. 1998); Video Software Dealers Ass'n Inc. v. City of Oklahoma City, 6
F. Supp. 2d 1292 (D. Ok. 1997) (ordering that confiscated videotapes be returned).
14 See William A. Weathers, Three Bookstore Workers Cited in Obscenity Case, THE CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, Jul. 1, 1994 at BI.
15 See Celestine Bohlen, A New 'Lolita'Stalls in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1997, at El.
16 See Carr, Unspeakable Practices, Unnatural Acts: The Taboo Art of Karen Finley, VILLAGE
VOICE, June 24, 1986, at 17.
17 See Artist Carries Out Mass Nude Photo Shoot in Public, CHI. TRIB., June 5,2000, at 8.
18 Christine Dolen, Arts Under Fire, YORK DAILY RECORD, March 19, 1995, at 7, available in 1995
WL 4896376.
19 See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. Rv. 73 (1996) (discussing status of
art in First Amendment). Compare Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup.
CT. REv. 245, 262 (arguing that literature and the arts merit protection because they inform the political
process by imparting sensitivity to human values) with Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
[Vol. 103:205
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speech, but why? Art's First Amendment value is hard to reconcile with the
underlying rationale for protecting speech under the First Amendment: the
marketplace of ideas. Free speech theorists have long reasoned that broad
protection for speech will result in a competitive marketplace for truth, and
furthermore, that truth will triumph in a free market. As John Milton explained, for
truth to emerge, we need a system in which truth and falsehood freely grapple.21
The marketplace of ideas model makes several assumptions. It tends to
value speech that can be classified as "ideas," that is rational rather than emotional,
that conveys a "particularized message," that is discursive and direct.3 Often this
metaphor of the marketplace is articulated in instrumental political terms: the
marketplace of ideas is essential not just because we value truth in general, but
because we value political truth.24 As the Court said in Roth v. United States,2 its
first obscenity case: "The protection given speech and press was fashioned to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people."26 The marketplace model thus assigns to speech a
central role in our democracy.
Yet once we value speech for its rationally comprehensible ideas, as the
marketplace model does, then it becomes hard to accommodate protection for art. It
would be a reductive and cramped reading of art itself to suggest that the point of
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20-29 (1971) (finding "no [principled] basis" for protecting artistic
expression under the First Amendment because art lacks political significance). Compare Bery v. City of
New York, 906 F. Supp. 163, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (upholding regulation on selling art by finding that "art
does not carry either words of the particularized social and political messages upon which the First
Amendment places special value") with Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996) (reversing
district court decision and finding that art is protected by First Amendment).
20 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (protecting works of "serious artistic
value"). But cf. Young v. American Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976):
[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total
suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest that
society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and
lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate.
21 See JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 35 (Payson & Clarke, Ltd. 1927) (1644) ("Let [truth] and
Falsehood grapple: who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter."). Milton's work
influenced John Stuart Mill. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 60-61 (Prometheus Books ed. 1986). The
Supreme Court relied on Mill's theory in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the landmark libel case. 376 U.S.
254, 279 n.19 (1964) (quoting Mill).
22 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (stating that First Amendment scrutiny is
triggered whenever "an intent to convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding
circumstances the likelihood was greater that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.")
(citations omitted). But see Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995) (questioning Spence's "particularized message" language).
23 See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 19.
24 For one case articulating the assumption that political speech is the core of the First Amendment,
see, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,218-19 (1966).
25 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
26 Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
2000]
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an abstract painting is to express an idea, let alone a political idea? 7
One reason that art is particularly hard to fit within the marketplace model
stems from art's visual rather than verbal form. Of course, there is some art that is
textual. And of course, there are many visual images that are not art. But for
purposes of this argument, I will focus on art as a subset of all visual speech.
Therefore, the problem for art may be viewed as part of a larger problem: I
believe that the First Amendment offers greater protection to speech that is verbal
rather than visual.28 The preference for text over image surfaces in a variety of
places in First Amendment thinking. It is, however, a peculiar preference: it is often
assumed and rarely explained. I know of no scholarship that addresses it directly.
Yet the difference between text and image within the First Amendment has
significant real world implications. It is evident, for example, in the pattern of
contemporary obscenity prosecutions, which have focused exclusively on pictorial
rather than textual material.29 The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography
noted and encouraged this trend in 1986, pointing to the Supreme Court's
acknowledgement of the "special prominence of the printed word," as compared to
images, in free speech law.30 There is "for all practical purposes, no prosecution of
[purely textual] materials now. '31 The preference for text also arises in child
pornography law, which focuses exclusively on pictures.32 And it turns up as an
assumption in a variety of scholarly thinking. For example, Catharine MacKinnon's
anti-pornography writing argues that pictorial pornography, especially
photography, is far more harmful to women than is textual pornography.3 All of
these approaches evidence an assumption that text should merit more protection
than images under the First Amendment.
27 This may explain the Court's strggle with the First Amendment status of cinema. Initially, in
1915, the Court concluded that motion pictures were not "organs of public opinion" but only "mere
representations of events, of ideas and sentiments...." Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 236 U.S. 230,
243-44 (1915). Later, the Court changed its mind, according First Amendment protection to cinema in
Joseph Burs"y, Inc, v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952). But even in this decision, the Court revealed a very
cramped vision of the value of cinema, stating that "motion pictures are a significant medium for the
communication of ideas." Id. at 501. Although this is undoubtedly true, the statement does not begin to
capture the multiple reasons society values cinema.
28 For a discussion of the different impact of text and images, see Rudolf Amheim, The Images of
Pictures and Words, 2 WORD & IMAGE 306 (Oct.-Dec. 1986).
29 See Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119 (1973) ("A book [as opposed to pictures] seems to
have a different and preferred place in our hierarchy of values, and so it should be.").
30 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 382 (1986).
31 Id.
32 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) ("We note that the distribution of descriptions
or other depictions of sexual conduct [by children], not otherwise obscene, which do not involve liN'
performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of live performances, retains First Amendment
protection.").
33 See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY];
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSEs ON LIFE AND LAW (1987).
[Vol. 103:205
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III. THE DANGER OF ART
Thus, it is hard to articulate why art is valuable under a marketplace of
ideas model of the First Amendment-why it even invokes First Amendment
protection to begin with. But the problem is more complicated. There is also
something about art, and about visual images in general, that makes people
perceive them as dangerous.
Let's return to Catharine MacKinnon, the leading scholar of the feminist
anti-pornography movement, mentioned above. MacKinnon argues that we should
ban pornography not because it is immoral or offensive or worthless- reasoning
that comes from obscenity law' - but because it constructs a world of violence,
subjugation and inequality for women.3s Given the harms MacKinnon attributes to
pornography, it is unsurprising that she would make no exception for artistic value.
MacKinnon rejects the traditional test for obscenity set out in Miller v. California,'e
which protects a work that may otherwise be labeled obscene if it demonstrates
"serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."37 She writes: "[C]ommercial
sex resembles art because both exploit women's sexuality. 38 In contrast to
obscenity law, MacKinnon insists that art should not merit any special status or
exception in her pornography analysis. "
34 In a tortured series of opinions since the 1957 case of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957),
the Supreme Court has defined "obscenity" as a constitutional term of art. In contrast, the Court has never
defined "pornography." It has, however, defined the term "child pornography" as a distinct category of
speech. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
35 See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL RIGHTS:
A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY 36, 46 (1988) ("[P]omography institutionalizes a subhuman victimized
second class status for women.").
36 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
37 Id at 24. As I have shown before, even that standard, which purports to protect artistic expression,
offers less than sufficient protection due to the nature of contemporary art and to the cramped nature of the Court's
analysis. Adler, Post-Modem Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, supra note 2.
MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 33.
39 MacKinnon and Dworkin's most detailed definition of pornography arises in the form of their
model civil rights ordinance. This ordinance defines pornography as:
The graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures and/or words
that also includes one or more of the following:(i) women are presented dehumanized as
sexual objects, things, or commodities; or (ii) women are presented as sexual objects
who enjoy pain or humiliation; or (iii) women are presented as sexual objects who
experience sexual pleasure in being raped; or (iv) women are presented as sexual objects
tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt; or (v) women are presented
in postures or positions of sexual submission, servility, or display; or (vi) women's body
parts - including but not limited to vaginas, breasts, or buttocks - are exhibited such that
women are reduced to those parts; or (vii) women are presented as whores by nature; or
(viii) women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or (ix) women are
presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, torture, shown as filthy or inferior,
bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual.
DWORKIN & MACKINNON, supra note 35.
Operating only through civil remedies, the model ordinance provides five possible causes of
action to individuals clalming to have been harmed by pornography. Slightly modified versions of this
2000]
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But MacKinnon does not ignore artistic value altogether. If anything, artistic
status could make speech more, rather than less, harmful for MacKinnon. In a curious
passage she writes,
[I]f a woman is subjected, why should it matter that the work has
other value? Perhaps what redeems a work's value among men
enhances its injury to women. Existing standards of literature, art,
science, and politics, are, in feminist light, remarkably consonant
with pornography's mode, meaning and message.40
Note what's going on here. First, MacKinnon suggests that value is irrelevant.
After all, according to her, this is speech that causes rape and subjugation. Why should
we care about art museums? But MacKinnon goes further. Artistic value is not
completely extraneous to our inquiry. In fact, artistic value makes pornography worse.
Thus she writes that if a work is pornographic but has artistic value, it becomes even
more harmful; as she puts it, value "enhances" the injury to women.4' This view
stands the Miller reasoning on its head.
This theme about the danger of artistic images has a long history in western
civilization. In Exodus, Chapter twenty, Verse four, the Hebrew Bible commands:
Thou shall not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness
of anything that is in heaven above or that is in the earth beneath
or that is in the water under the earth ....
Recall that the Second Commandment was handed down from Moses to the
people on tablets in the midst of the "Golden Calf' episode of the Bible.43 Moses went
to receive the Word of God and, in his absence, the Israelites became distracted."4
They built the Golden Calf, a glittery golden image, and began dancing around it as
ordinance were passed by the City Councils of Minneapolis and Indianapolis in the 1980s, but neither is
currently in effect The Mayor of Minneapolis refused to sign his city's bill. See The Minneapolis Civil Rights
Ordinance, With Proposed Feminist Pornography Amendments, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY 181, 183-84 (1985)
(reprinting proposed amendments to Minneapolis Code of Ordinances, tit. 7, chs. 139 & 141). The
Indianapolis City Council passed a modified version of this definition into law, eliminating subsections (i),
(v), (vi), and (vii), and substituting instead as (vi) "women are presented as sexual objects for domination,
conquest, violation, exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or positions of servility or
submission or display." Indianapolis, Ind., Code 16-3(q) (1984). However, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals struck down the Indianapolis ordinance on constitutional grounds, terming it "thought control."
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F. 2d 323, 324 (7th Cir. 1985), affd mem., 475 U.S. 1001
(1986).
40 MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 33, at 202; see also DWORKIN and MAcKINNON
supra note 35 at 199 ("Sex in life is no less mediated than it is in art. ... It is not that life and art imitate each
other; in sexuality, they are each other."); id. at 203 ("Commercial sex resembles art because both exploit
women's sexuality").
41 MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 33, at 202.
42 Exod. 20:4-5.
43 See id. at 32:1-35.
See id. at 32:1.
[Vol. 103:205
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they lapsed intci decadent sensuality and distraction.45 When Moses returned with the
inscribed Word of God, he broke the tablets in anger at what he beheld. This idolatry
was no small matter. Moses killed 3,000 men.47 He burnt the Golden Calf, strewing its
dust into the water, and made the people drink it.48 Only then did Moses give God's
commandments once again to the Israelites.49 This passage marks the elevation of the
Word over the image in the Bible. It vividly illustrates the hazardous sensuality of
visual representation.
The story of the Golden Calf represents a pervasive theme in the religious
literature: images are dangerous because of their irrational power, their appeal to
passion rather than reason. The seductive quality of artistic images, their appeal to
the senses and the emotions, has been a recurring justification in the complex and
centuries-old history of iconoclasm, censorship, and suppression of art. The
voluptuousness of art, its power beyond words, the possibility that it could be
worshipped, fetishized, or misinterpreted, paved the way for both adulation and
censorship. This view, of course, helps to explain why First Amendment law would
devalue images: by bypassing reason and appealing directly to the senses, images
fail to participate in the marketplace of ideas.
This historical fear of images that motivated iconoclasm is still present in
our culture and, I believe, in our First Amendment law.50 This history illuminates
not only why art and images are vulnerable under free speech law, but it also
suggests a way to reevaluate art's position. The tremendous power of visual images
shows us that the very thing that often provokes censorship of art is -the very thing
that ought to invoke First Amendment protection for it.
IV. CAPTURE THE FLAG: THE VALUE OF VISUAL IMAGES
I'd like to turn to an improbable but appropriate source for thinking about the
status of art under the First Amendment: West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette. l Barnette was a flag case about Jehovah's Witnesses who didn't want to
salute the flag in school.52 What does it have to do with art? I want to make a case that
45 See id. at 32:19.
46 See id.
47 See Exod. 32:28.
48 See id. at 32:20.
49 See id. at 34:1-9.
so For an example of the persistence of this fear in early American culture, see, e.g., NATHANIEL
HAWTHORNE, THE PROPHETIC PICTURES (1882) ("Some deemed [painting] an offence against the Mosaic
Law, and even a presumptuous mockery of the Creator .... Others, frightened at the art... were inclined to
consider the painter as a magician."). For a discussion of the roots of this American attitude in English
culture, see, e.g., JOHN PHILLIPS, THE REFORMATION OF IMAGES, (1973) at xii (noting that images were viewed as
"perilous in themselves, full of the destrctive power of their always-suspect origins").
51 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
52 See id. at 629.
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it does. Bear with me as I offer an unconventional reading of the case.
Barnette struck down a regulation that required children in public schools to
salute the flag. 3 The plaintiffs were parents who brought suit to restrain enforcement
of this regulation against their children who were Jehovah's Witnesses. 4 Why didn't
the Jehovah's Witnesses want to salute the flag? Fittingly for this discussion, their
religious beliefs led them to consider the flag a graven image within the prohibition of
the Ten Commandments.55 Saluting the flag was idolatry, as wrong as fetishizing the
Golden Calf. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Barnette quoted the Ten Commandments'
prohibition on graven images to explain why the Jehovah's Witnesses wouldn't salute
the flag.-
The issue in Barnette was the expressive meaning of saluting the flag, which
the Court considered a "form of utterance. 5 7 Nonetheless, the Court lingered at some
length over the meaning of the flag itself as speech. It is here that I think the Court
gives us a glimpse of its thinking about the strange power of visual speech. The flag's
message is, after all, conveyed solely through its visual image. It is a wordless pattern
of stars, stripes and colors.
In a curious passage, the Court talks about the nature of visual symbols.
Justice Jackson writes for the Court: "Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of
communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag.., is a short cut from mind to
mind . . . ."5 Note what's going on in these lines. Visual images are double edged;
they are both "primitive but effective."59 When Justice Jackson says that an image
works as a "short cut from mind to mind," he portrays images as forceful, but crude.60
They're a cheat, a short cut.
Furthermore, there is a certain treachery to images. The Court's opinion
reveals a nagging uncertainty about how to account for the flag's meaning.
Consider what Justice Jackson says next: "A person gets from a symbol the
meaning he puts into it, and what is one man's comfort and inspiration is another's
jest and scorn." 6t This passage portrays visual symbols as a potentially hazardous form
of communication. If the meaning of a visual symbol rests in the mind of the person
who sees it, then a speaker who uses a symbol to convey a message runs a risk that the
53 See id. at 642.
5 See id. at 629-30.
5 See id. at 629.
56 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 629 ("Their religious beliefs include a literal version of Exodus, Chapter
20, verses 4 and 5, which says: 'Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything
that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not
bow down thyself to them nor serve them."').
57 Id. at 624.
58 Id. at 632.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632-33.
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symbol will mean something other than what he intended. Thus, alongside the great
power of the visual symbol as speech-it is a primitive and effective shortcut--runs
the possibility of betrayal or treachery. The visual symbol is so powerful that it may
overpower the speaker. He may not be able to control its meaning.
This same ambivalence about the power and the danger of visual images
resurfaces in the Court's later flag burning cases. Not much has changed since
Barnette. Let's turn to the 1989 case of Texas v. Johnson.!2 Here the Court considered
the conviction of a man who burned a flag at a political protest held outside the 1984
Republican convention in Texas.! The Court struck down the defendant's conviction
under a Texas statute that prohibited "desecration" of the American flag.64
On First Amendment grounds, Texas v. Johnson should have been an easy
case. The statute at issue fell well within precedents prohibiting content
discrimination. But emotionally this case was very difficult for the Court. Both the
majority and the dissent in Johnson seemed struck by the strange force of the flag as a
visual symbol.
The majority in Johnson focused on the special multivalent quality of the flag
as a visual image. Just as the Court in Barnette had discussed the way in which the
meaning of a visual image would fluctuate dramatically depending on who was
viewing it and what his attitude was, to the Texas v. Johnson Court, the special quality
of the flag was its capacity to convey multiple meanings. In fact, according to the
majority, it was this quality of the flag that explained why the statute at issue was
unconstitutional.6s The majority reasoned that the problem with the Texas statute was
that it said you could use the flag in only one way, to express patriotism.66 But to limit
the flag in this manner was to cut off precisely what is unique and powerful about the
symbol: that numerous meanings inhere within it. The Court held that you can't
impoverish the cultural realm by confining the flag to only one meaning when by its
nature it is capable of so many different interpretations. 67 Visual images by their nature
cannot be confined. In short, you can't capture the flag.
What is the dissent's response to this? Yes, the majority is right. Yes, the
Texas law is an example of content discrimination. Yes, it is even viewpoint
discrimination. But this is theflag.8 And because it's the flag, content discrimination,
even viewpoint discrimination, is acceptable. The flag is so important that it should be
62 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
63 See ia at 399-400.
64 See id. at 400 (quoting Texas Penal Code Ann. § 42.09 (1989)).
6s See id. at 419.
See id. at 418.
67 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 417 ("To conclude that the government may permit designated symbols to be
used to communicate only a limited set of messages would be to enter territory having no discernible or
defensible boundaries.").
68 Id. at 422 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("For more than 200 years, the American flag has occupied a
unique position as the symbol of our Nation, a uniqueness that justifies a governmental prohibition against
flag burning.").
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an exception to all First Amendment principles.
Why? What is it about the flag that should cause us to ignore clear First
Amendment precedent? Isn't the flag after all a piece of cloth? Not according to
Justice Rehnquist. In his dissent, he writes about the "mystical reverence" '69 with
which people regard the flag, the "uniquely deep awe and respect"70 that we hold for
it. When Justice Rehnquist says the "flag is not simply another 'idea' or 'point of
view' competing for recognition in the marketplace of ideas," '7 it is as if he is saying
that the flag is so powerful, so mystical and awe-inspiring that it is no longer an idea,
no longer speech.72 In fact, Justice Rehnquist attributes a religious quality to the flag.
He mocks the majority opinion for telling us that the First Amendment prohibits the
government from insisting on one correct meaning for the flag.73 When he says the
government has not "established" our feeling for the flag, that 200 years of history
have done that, he puts the word "established" in quotes, conjuring up the religious
establishment cases. 4
Remember that the Jehovah's Witnesses in Barnette thought about the flag as
a graven image. 5 One danger of a graven image is that it may inspire idolatry. People
may worship the image of God rather than God himself.
And speaking of idolatry, there is a strange, wonderfully understandable
slippage in Justice Rehnquist's opinion. At the close of his rhetorically stirring
argument, he writes that the majority's ruling means that men "must fight and
perhaps die for the flag, but the government may not prohibit the public burning of
the banner under which they fight. I would uphold the Texas statute as applied in
this case."76
Do people really die for the flag? Don't people actually die for what it
represents? There is a confusion here between the image and reality. This confusion is
of course understandable. Let's imagine soldiers on a battlefield in the heat of terror
and violence. To them, the sight of the flag may become so fused with what it
represents--our side; our country; living vs. dying-that you can see why they might
feel that they are indeed fighting for the flag. It is a rich and powerful symbol. But
here and at another point where Rehnquist says the flag "embodies" our nation, 7 I
think his slippage between the image and what it stands for reveals something deeper
69 Id. at 429.
70 Id. at 434.
71 Id. at 429.
72 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 432. Rehnquist on the one hand attempts to dismiss the First Amendment
value of flag burning, calling it "an inarticulate grunt or roar." Id. On the other hand, his opinion revels in his
beatific reverence for the flag and thus pays tribute to the power of the image. See id.
73 See id. at 422.
74 Id. at 434.
75 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 629.
76 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 435.
77 See id.
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about images. They are so strong, such a plain "short cut" to our minds, that they
tempt us to conflate representation with reality.
There is an irrationality to Justice Rehnquist's opinion, as if he is caught in
the grip of the symbol himself, as if the emotional, mystical, religious power of a
visual image has overwhelmed him and made him take an easy case and struggle with
it. It is as if the danger of visual images, their primitive force, has manifested itself in
this opinion. For a brief moment, Justice Rehnquist has given way to idolatry.
V. CONCLUSION: RETHINKING THE PLACE OF ART IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Perhaps images are "primitive" as the Court said in Barnette.78 There is a
magical, talismanic quality to images. Think of voodoo dolls, based on the belief that
harming the object can harm the person. Think of the act of hanging someone in
effigy. There is something about an image that tempts us to fuse it with what it
represents. Of course this is the basis of idolatry: the danger of building an icon to God
is that we might become so entranced with the image-its sensual, beautiful, irrational
quality-that we end up worshipping the thing itself, forgetting that it is only a
representation. The image is so beguiling that we lose all sense. The next step, of
course, is iconoclasm, or censorship.7
In the flag cases the Court begins to reckon with the power and significance
of speech that is irrational, nondiscursive, iconic, emotional, visual. In contrast to those
cases and theories that we've confronted in which the First Amendment privileges
words and the sensible marketplace of ideas that they inhabit, suddenly, in the flag
cases, we see that the importance of visual images is within the Court's grasp.
Visual images are frequently perceived as more powerful and less
controllable than verbal speech. They do not fit comfortably within our current notion
of a reasoned, rational marketplace of ideas. I suggest that this lack of fit should cause
us not to discard images from the protection of the First Amendment, but instead cause
us to rethink the cramped First Amendment model that we currently insist on.'
Shouldn't a free speech model offer protection to speech particularly when it is
forceful and capable of provoking strong reactions?
These cases could be the start of the Court's thinking about art more
generally, about why it is important and why it is different from words. Yet the
peculiar power of images may also explain the Court's anxiety. The force of visual
images so evident in these cases illuminates both why we censor art but, more
importantly, why we should protect it.
78 Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
79 See generally DAVID FREEDBERG, THE POWER OF IMAGES (1989).
80 One place to start would be to question our assumptions about the current meanings we assign to
certain terms that are key for evaluating speech under the marketplace model: terms, for example, such as
"idea," "rationality" and "reason!'
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